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This paper provides evidence on the performance of business angels’ investments,
using a unique data-set covering a representative sample of the main actors in the
Italian informal venture capital market. An econometric analysis examines the
returns on business angels’ investments and their major determinants, making refer-
ence to an original set of independent variables. Whereas previous empirical studies
have hypothesised linear relationships between the explanatory variables and the
performance of informal venture capitalists’ investments, this work tests different
functional forms, both linear and non-linear. The main findings are as follows: (1)
the relationship between experience and internal rate of return (IRR) is U-shaped
and significant; (2) the widely accepted expectation that investments with a short
holding period earn a lower IRR is confirmed by quantitative data; (3) an original
explanatory variable – rejection rate – is put into the model and its impact on busi-
ness angels’ performance is positive, non-linear and significant; (4) the final overall
econometric model shows relevant explanatory power, with an R-squared close to
35%. The outcomes of the empirical analysis performed in this study allow the iden-
tification of new and concrete insights into possible public policy interventions
aimed at stimulating the informal venture capital industry and, therefore,
entrepreneurship inside the economic system.
Keywords: business angels; informal venture capital; funding gap; determinants of
performance; IRR; experience; holding period; rejection rate
JEL codes: G24; G32
1. Introduction
Based on a unique data-set on investments by business angels (BAs) in Italy in the
2007–2012 time period, this paper investigates the major drivers of the performance of
investments by business angels. It therefore extends to the informal venture capital mar-
ket research areas and methodologies widely applied in the literature dealing with the
formal venture capital and private equity markets.
Both formal and informal venture capitalists play complementary roles in a coun-
try’s financial system by filling the funding gap that exists between the demand for
financial resources by start-up companies and the supply of early stage equity capital.
However, business angels have received much less attention in the finance literature
than venture capitalists, despite the mounting evidence of their importance in the
creation and early growth of new firms. Indeed, since its development, the market for
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informal venture capital has consistently financed many more small firms than the
formal venture capital market (Mason and Harrison 2000a, 2008; Sohl 2003a, 2008;
EBAN 2008, 2012; Wiltbank et al. 2009; OECD 2011).
The market for informal venture capital includes various typologies of investors,
among which the most important are business angels, who finance small and newly
constituted companies by, usually, buying minority equity stakes. Business angels are
typically private minority investors who finance predominantly early stage firms with
their own private savings through the form of equity capital. Their purpose is to realise
a financial gain when selling their shares as well as to obtain non-pecuniary benefits
related to their non-institutional nature. Furthermore, business angels provide their
investee businesses not only with equity capital, but also with knowledge and the fruits
of their personal networks, filling not only the above-mentioned funding gap, but also
the reputational and experience gap which normally affects start-ups (Harrison and
Mason 1992; Landström 1993). They respect a code of ethics including, among others,
rules for confidentiality and fairness of treatment (vis-à-vis entrepreneurs and other
BAs), and compliance with anti-money-laundering.
Although there are similarities with formal venture capitalists as far as equity
investment activity is concerned, business angels and venture capitalists are different
types of investors. The first difference, and maybe the most important given its direct
impact on their closer interaction with the invested company, is that business angels
invest their own capital and not funds committed by others (Freear, Sohl, and Wetzel
1992; Coveney and Moore 1998). The second is that business angels have a small
amount of capital to invest compared to that which venture capitalists have at their dis-
posal, and thus prefer small companies (although in recent years business angels have
started to syndicate investments in order to finance bigger projects: Mason and Harrison
2000a; Sohl 2007). The third difference between business angels and venture capitalists
is their motivations for investing. Venture capitalists invest exclusively for achieving
target financial returns, with predefined evaluation models, risk/gain profiles and invest-
ment strategies. On the other hand, the utility function of business angels is driven by
financial returns as well as by non-pecuniary benefits such as playing an entrepreneurial
role, working with and mentoring highly talented and creative people, discovering new
technologies, being invited to pitch presentations, interacting with other angels and
actors in the financial community, and the status from being perceived as a sophisti-
cated investor (Haines, Madill, and Riding 2003; Morrisette 2007; Ibrahim 2008; Hsu
et al. 2014). The fourth difference is that business angels have no or limited diversifica-
tion strategies, nor do they commit themselves simultaneously in multiple investments.
Their major risk management technique is the small proportion of invested capital over
their total personal assets, thus limiting the impact of a negative performance on their
net worth (Freear, Sohl, and Wetzel 1992; Van Osnabrugge 2000; Johnson and Sohl
2012). The fifth difference is that because of the limited publicity that angels attract,
the deal flow of potential opportunities – and therefore the match between them and
entrepreneurs – is much more limited when compared to the deal flow of formal ven-
ture capitalists deal flow, who can benefit from their higher visibility (Mustilli and
Gangi 1999; Paul, Whittam, and Wyper 2007; Shane 2008; Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar
2011). Finally, the evaluation and due diligence process, as well as the negotiation
stage, are different with greater personal involvement by business angels on account of
the small size of investments which makes it uneconomic to use of auditors, and pro-
fessional and legal advisors (Mason and Harrison 1996a, 2000b; Wiltbank et al. 2009;
Mitteness, Baucus, and Sudek 2012).
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Since the 1990s, informal venture capitalists have tried to increase the quality of
their operations by gathering in semi-formal associations or groups of angels, usually
on a territorial or industrial basis, sharing presentation pitches from potential entrepre-
neurs, due diligence on the potential investment opportunities, and the associated trans-
action costs and co-investing along with other group members (Mason 2006; Sohl
2007; Paul and Whittam 2010; Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar 2011). These associations have
largely replaced business angel networks (BANs) whose role was to ‘match’ entrepre-
neurs with business angels. Potential entrepreneurs submitted business plans to the net-
works, which selected the best projects according to angels’ preferences, ultimately
generating an investment deal flow for a given angel or group of angels. Members had
to prove that they were accredited angels. Unlike the BANs of the 1990s, today’s
equivalent angel networks are now interactive and much less fragmented (for instance,
in Italy there exists only one network at a national level), and adopt similar templates
and operating procedures, hence entrepreneurs who submit their projects are aware that
they will be analysed by the best angels, which ensures professional screening of the
projects and the best contribution of either monetary and non-monetary resources
(among others, advisory, reputation and connections with the financial community).
Although angel networks have contributed to the visibility and prominence of busi-
ness angels, it is still a major challenge to identify and collect representative samples
of the population of business angels. This limits the possibility of extending to this
segment of financial markets all of the many different research areas and empirical
analyses conducted on venture capital and private equity, notably the identification and
measurement of the performance of business angel investments and the major drivers
which influence performance, which is the issue examined in this paper.
For this reason, the major contribution of this paper for the entrepreneurial finance
literature is the extensive analysis of the Italian informal venture capital market, which
is based on a unique database that contains the details of 143 disinvestments made in
Italy by 102 informal investors in the 2007–2012 period. This data-set allows the possi-
bility of running a multivariate regression aimed at testing the existence of a statisti-
cally relevant relationship between an original set of independent variables (industry,
experience, holding period, rejection rate, year of divestiture) and the profitability of
business angels’ investments. As a further contribution, unlike in previous studies about
informal venture capitalists which assume linear relationships between the explanatory
variables and the return on investments, the empirical analysis will be performed
through a multivariate regression based on different functional forms – both linear and
non-linear – for the set of explanatory variables used as proxies for the major
determinants of the performance of business angels’ investments.
The major empirical findings are as follows. First, consistent with literature about for-
mal venture capital, the relationship between experience and internal rate of return (IRR)
is U-shaped and significant, confirming a tendency towards overconfidence for expert
BAs. Second, the widely accepted expectation that investments with a short holding per-
iod (below three years) earn a lower IRR is confirmed by quantitative data. Third, an
original explanatory variable – the rejection rate of investment proposals – is positive and
non-linear and has a significant impact on business angels’ performance. Fourth, the final
overall econometric model, including as control variables BAs’ exit strategies and
education, shows relevant explanatory power, with an R-squared close to 35%.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section profiles the main features and
investment strategies of Italian business angels and compares them with formal venture
capital investors. The third section examines the relevant literature regarding the
Venture Capital 273
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r V
inc
en
zo
 C
ap
izz
i] 
at 
02
:19
 25
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
informal venture capital industry. The fourth section is devoted to the empirical
analysis, describing the data-set, the methodology and the outcomes obtained. A brief
descriptive analysis of the 2007–2012 Italian venture capital market is also provided.
The final section includes some concluding remarks and suggestions for policy-makers.
2. Literature review on informal venture capitalists
Business angels have been the subject of numerous studies during the past 30 years or
so, with the first studies by Wetzel (1981, 1983, 1986) and Gaston (1989a, 1989b) dat-
ing back to the 1980s and relating to the USA. In those years, business angels were
almost unknown and the research was aimed at discovering their main features.
Subsequently, other contributions on the informal venture capital market in developed
and later emerging countries emerged.
There are different ways of classifying the major streams of research on business
angels over time. Most adopt a chronologic and evolutionary approach (Freear, Sohl,
and Wetzel 2002; Mason 2008; Johnson and Sohl 2012). In this paper – consistent with
the approach followed by Macht (2006) – a classification approach based on research
themes will be used. Eight themes can be identified.
The first group comprises studies aimed at identifying and profiling business angels.
A sub-theme considers the role played by BANs. These contributions answer research
questions such as ‘what are the main features of the business angels (age, gender, resi-
dence, etc.)?’, ‘what are their educational and working backgrounds?’, ‘how much
money do they invest (also as a percentage of their wealth)?’, ‘what are the industries
which receive the most investment?’, ‘what are the main specificities and operations
performed by business angel networks?’ and ‘how is it possible to provide public pol-
icy support to business angel networks?’ The most important studies which profile
business angels include Wetzel (1986), Gaston (1989b), Freear, Sohl, and Wetzel
(1992), Riding (1993), Landström (1993), Mason and Harrison (1994, 1997), Wetzel
and Freear (1993), Coveney and Moore (1998), Lerner (1998), Aernoudt (1999), Visser
and Williams (2001), Paul, Whittam, and Johnston (2003), Harrison and Mason (2007),
Sohl and Hill (2007), Morrisette (2007), Sohl (2007), Mason (2009), Paul and Whittam
(2010), Sohl and Becker-Blease (2010), Christensen (2011), KfW (2011), Festel and
De Cleyn (2013) and Li et al. (2014). A further output stemming from these contribu-
tions is the evidence of the added value provided by BANs to both investors and
entrepreneurs. It is now widely accepted that the unit of analysis and measurement
when studying informal venture capitalists can be either single angels or angels groups.
The second stream of contributions comprises studies which measure the size, com-
position and growth trends of the informal venture capital market, either at the national
or continental level, and shedding further light on the behaviour of its main actors,
comprise. Some examples of research questions investigated are: ‘what is the size of
the growth trend of the informal venture capital market in a given country/region?’,
‘what are the industries which receive the most investment by BAs?’, ‘what is the typi-
cal holding period of business angels’ investments?’, ‘what are their preferred exit
strategies?’. Among the most important publications are those by Wetzel (1987),
Landström (1993), Reitan and Sørhein (2000), Mustilli and Sorrentino (2003), Bygrave
et al. (2003), Sohl (2003b, 2008), Fleming (2004), Mason and Harrison (2008), Scheela
and Isidro (2009), Capizzi and Giovannini (2010), Nath (2010), OECD (2011),
Kraemer-Eis and Schillo (2011), Lahti (2011), Scheela and Jittrapanum (2012),
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Timm (2012), Moses and Adebisi (2013), Romani, Atienza, and Amoros (2013) and
Carpentier and Suret (2015).
The third research theme examines the relationship between BAs and hi-tech firms,
addressing such issues such as: ‘do BAs’ investments boost technology development?’,
‘do hi-tech firms generate a higher IRR when compared with non-hi-tech start-ups?’,
‘do BAs share peculiar technology-specific knowledge with target companies?’, ‘what
are the specificities of technology angels when compared to other informal investors?’.
The most relevant contributions include Freear and Wetzel (1990), Amason and
Sapienza (1993), Manigart and Struyf (1997), Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1998), Freear,
Sohl, and Wetzel (2002), Mason and Harrison (2003), Erikson and Sørheim (2005),
Madill, Haines, and Riding (2005), Shane (2008), Metrick and Yasuda (2011) and
Festel and De Cleyn (2013).
The fourth group of contributions focuses on both the investment process under-
taken by BAs and their investment evaluation procedures. This group of studies also
includes empirical analyses dealing with the identification of the major value drivers of
the capital invested. These studies answer research questions such as: ‘how do BAs
select target companies?’, ‘how do BAs appraise target companies?’, ‘what is the
impact of non-pecuniary benefits in BAs’ investment process?’, ‘how does the and
background of BAs influence their investment criteria?’, ‘what is the role played by
investee company managers?’, ‘what are the drivers of the capital invested?’. Among
the major contributions include Landström (1995), Haar, Starr, and MacMillan (1988),
Feeney, Haines, and Riding (1999), Van Osnabrugge (2000), Mason and Harrison
(2002a, 2003), Mason and Stark (2004), Maula, Autio, and Arenius (2005), Sohl
(2006), Paul, Whittam, and Wyper (2007), Wiltbank et al. (2006), Riding, Madill, and
Haines (2007), Sudek, Mitteness, and Baucus (2008), Clark (2008), Harrison, Mason,
and Robson (2010), Capizzi and Tirino (2011), Macht (2011a), Mitteness, Baucus, and
Sudek (2012), Collewaert (2012) and Bammens and Collewaert (2013).
The fifth group of contributions, paralleling a defined research stream in the private
equity and venture capital literature, investigates the determinants of the performance
of investments by business angels, answering the following research questions: ‘what
are the major factors affecting the performance of BA investments?’, ‘what are the
functional forms of the determinants of IRR of BA investments?’ ‘what’s the role of
BANs in explaining return differences amongst BAs?’1. Examples of empirical analyses
focused on this research topic can be found in Lumme, Mason, and Suomi (1996),
Mason and Harrison (2002b), Mason and Harrison (2004), Mason (2005), Wiltbank
(2005), Heukamp, Liechtenstein, and Wakeling (2007), Wiltbank and Boeker (2007),
DeGennaro and Dwyer (2008), Wiltbank et al. (2009) and Capizzi (2011).
The sixth stream of contributions addresses another issue that is also widely investi-
gated in the private equity and venture capital literature, namely the impact of the
hands on contributions of business angels on the value creation process and profitability
of their investee companies. The typical research questions are: ‘what is the perfor-
mance of angel-backed firms?’, ‘does BAs’ experience matter?’, ‘do angel-backed firms
deliver better post-IPO performance?’, ‘what are the appropriate financial indicators to
use in order to measure the impact of BAs post-investment?’. Among the most impor-
tant publications in this recent research field are: Ardichvili et al. (2002), Davila,
Foster, and Gupta (2003), Delmar and Shane (2006), Chahine, Filatotchev, and Wright
(2007), Johnson and Sohl (2012), Macht and Robinson (2009), Kerr, Lerner, and
Schoar (2011), Goldfarb et al. (2012) and Vanacker, Collewaert, and Paeleman (2013).
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The seventh group of contributions includes all those studies aimed at comparing
the activities and performance of business angels with those of venture capitalists
(VCs) and analyses of the relationship between angel financing and venture capital
financing. It is also possible to consider in this group contributions which investigate
the effect of coinvestments between BAs and VCs and contributions which measure
the impact of formal and informal investors on venture-backed and angel-backed com-
panies. The main research questions are: ‘what are the major differences between busi-
ness angels and venture capitalists?’, ‘are BAs and VCs substitutes or
complementary?’, do BAs and VCs invest in the same firms?’, ‘do they invest sequen-
tially or simultaneously?’, ‘what kind of impact do business angels and venture capital-
ists have on the firms in which they invest?’. The most important publications are:
Mason and Harrison (2000a), Sohl (2003a), Chiruvolu (2004), Chahine, Filatotchev,
and Wright (2007), Sudek, Mitteness, and Baucus (2008), Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar
(2011), Johnson and Sohl (2012), Bonnet and Wirtz (2012), Goldfarb et al. (2012),
Hellmann et al. (2013) and Hsu et al. (2014).
The final group of studies examines negotiation and contractual issues which char-
acterise the relationship between BAs and entrepreneurs, making reference to the para-
digm of information asymmetries and opportunistic behaviour. Examples of research
questions investigated are: ‘how do angels monitor investee companies?’, ‘what kind of
contingent contracts or clauses do BAs require?’, ‘how do BAs protect their invest-
ments?’, ‘what are the specificities of financing contracts signed by BAs?’ The most
relevant contributions include Van Osnabrugge (2000), Elitzur and Gavious (2003),
Chemmanur and Chen (2006), Cumming (2008), Wong, Bhatia, and Freeman (2009),
Erzurumlu et al. (2013), Cumming and Johan (2013) and Caselli, Garcia-Appendini,
and Ippolito (2013).
This paper investigates a research topic belonging to the fifth group of studies which
address the identification and measurement of the major drivers of performance of BA
investments. There are only a handful of published papers which have examined this issue,
mostly because of the challenges in assembling statistically significant samples of BA exits.
Mason and Harrison (2002b) used an econometric approach, selecting the following set of
explanatory variables: exit strategy, holding period, life cycle of the target company,
number of co-investors and potential of technologic innovation. The exit strategy and the
holding period were significantly correlated with the IRR of angel investments. Wiltbank
et al. (2009) used a different set of explanatory variables – investor experience, duration of
due diligence process, holding period, number of co-investors and strategic emphasis – and
found that the experience of the investor and the duration of the due diligence process were
significantly correlated to the return on investment. Recently, Capizzi (2011) performed an
empirical analysis of the Italian informal venture capital market, selecting four explanatory
variables: exit strategy, experience of the investor, holding period and reference industry.
The exit strategy and industry proved to be relevant determinants of the performance of BA
investments. The other two explanatory variables did not show a statistically significant
linear relation with the dependent variable.
The following empirical analysis is aimed at investigating the determinants of the
returns that business angels achieve from their investments, making reference to an
original set of explanatory variables when compared with previous contributions. How-
ever, before describing the methodology and the main results of the empirical analysis,
the data collection process that was undertaken in order to build the data-set will be
introduced along with a brief descriptive analysis of the informal venture capital market
in which the investments were made.
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3. Data, context, methodology and hypotheses
3.1. Data issues
This investigation of the Italian market faces the same identification and measurement
challenges that have been encountered by other studies of informal venture capital mar-
ket around the world. As Wetzel pointed out in his seminal work of 1983, the total
population of business angels is unknown and probably unknowable due to their
non-institutional nature, which implies an absence of the same information disclosure
requirements which are a feature of venture capital funds, and which, due to their pref-
erence for anonymity, makes data collection difficult for researchers. Furthermore, the
definition of angel investing is not univocal and has changed over the years. For
instance, some studies consider financing from family or friends to be angel investment
(Bygrave et al. 2003; Maula, Autio, and Arenius 2005). Some business angels do not
even consider their investments as ‘angel activity’. Another problem is the representa-
tiveness of the sample: it is impossible to weight the business angels who answer as
representative of the complete population, even at a regional level. Furthermore, most
business angels make relatively small investments, while only a few of them invest
large amounts; thus, missing just one big investment could jeopardise the results of the
research. Other issues include whether ‘virgin angels’, individuals looking for their first
investment and ‘non-active investors’, investors who made some investments in the
past but are no longer active because of a lack of liquidity and/or opportunities should
be included in surveys (Aram 1989; Harrison and Mason 1992; Coveney and Moore
1998).
Over the years, data collection has been improved thanks to BANs and better
knowledge about the basic features of this kind of investor, which allows researchers to
record BAs and their investments so that they can perform more sophisticated research.
Notwithstanding this, those BAs who are not members of BANs are still not measur-
able, making it impossible to analyse what is usually called the ‘invisible market’
(Mason and Harrison 2008).
The data-set used in this paper was created by processing data and qualitative infor-
mation generously provided by Italian Business Angels Network (IBAN), the national
association whose members include, on a voluntary basis, regional BANs, business
incubators, angel groups and single angel investors. IBAN, with its network reaching –
directly or through the associated BANs – about 300 business angels throughout the
country, is the largest angel group in Italy and the only one legitimated at both the
political and regulatory level.2
IBAN carries out a yearly survey that studies the activity of Italian business angels.
It takes the form of an on-line questionnaire forwarded to its members, either individual
angels or angels groups. The latter in turn manage the questionnaire fill in and collec-
tion process on behalf of IBAN. As part of the survey, questionnaires are also sent
through a variety of distribution channels to a large number of individuals believed –
or reported to by IBAN members – to be business angels operating in Italy.
Data covering the 2007–2012 time horizon were collected and processed in order to
create an overview of the size and structure of the informal venture capital market in
Italy and to extrapolate key features and expected trends in business angels’ behaviour.
The resulting output was disseminated by IBAN through an annual publication
prepared under the author’s scientific supervision. Authorisation was received to further
process the IBAN data in order to build a data-set consistent with the kind of empirical
analysis to be performed in this paper under the explicit – and highly reasonable –
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restriction that the confidentiality of single invested companies and business angels
remain secure.
Thus, the data-set includes details on 1304 submitted completed questionnaires and
143 exits made during the reference 6-year time period. Given the high rate of would-
be angels (potential investors who submitted the questionnaire but have not performed
any operations), which in some years was more than 50%, only data from active angels
(i.e. investors who perform at least one operation in any covered year) have been con-
sidered, thus reducing the sample to 230 investors and 554 entries. The number of
angels is lower than the number of exits, as reported in Table 1, consistent with the
possibility that some investors – sometimes defined as ‘serial angels’ – can make
multiple investments/divestments in any given year.
However, because of the nature of the survey (self-reported), it is not possible to
determine whether an investor has reported all their exits. Given the possible biases of
self-reported data, the author and IBAN have performed a preliminary scrutiny in order
to delete incomplete or inaccurate information and exits that were impossible to certify,
producing a final data-set of 96 verified exits. It is important to emphasise that the data
used for the following analyses must be interpreted with caution because it only
includes evidence of activity which took place largely within the IBAN network – what
has been termed the visible market (Mason and Harrison 2010, 2011). It therefore does
not represent the full extent of the business angel activity which exists in Italy.
3.2. Context: the Italian informal venture capital market: descriptive analysis
This section uses the data reported in Table 1 to present a profile of Italian BAs in
terms of their personal features, their investments and their exits. Summary information
is presented in Table 2.
In terms of their wealth, the bottom 50% of the angels has personal wealth in the
€250,000 to €1,250,000 range. However, 31% of the sample did not report this data.
Their most important source of deal flow is BANs (more than 50% of closed deals
were supervised by a BAN), followed by other entrepreneurs and investors’ clubs. The
most relevant issues considered when evaluating a business plan are the management
team (76%) and the potential growth of the target company (68%). Angels are gener-
ally minority investors: 95% bought less than 50% of the shares of the companies in
which they invested. Three-quarters of angels invest less than 15% of their personal
wealth in angel investments. Most angels are relatively infrequent investors with three-
quarters making less than eight investments in the 2007–2012 period. And only 38% of
Table 1. Sample’s statistics.
Year Surveyed angels
Exit
No. deals No. business angels No. observations for the analysis
2007 104 20 16 8
2008 140 29 21 23
2009 260 32 21 24
2010 313 18 15 15
2011 225 20 14 11
2012 262 24 15 15
Total 1304 143 102 96
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angels think that their most important contribution to their investee businesses is the
finance that they provide. The most important contribution to the financed firms is
advice on strategy (56%), followed by personal introductions to their industrial and
financial networks (45%). The total amount invested by angels increased from approxi-
mately 18,750,000 in 2007 to almost 33,800,000 in 2012. This can be attributed to a
combination of the following: different measurement methodologies, growth in the
Italian market and a higher response rate. The preferred industries of angels have
changed over the period. In 2012 most angels financed energy projects. In 2007, the
industries attracting most angel investment were software and ICT services.
Turning to the analysis of reported exits that occurred between 2007 and 2012 these
totalled 143 with only 12% of angels reporting one or more exits. The average holding
period was 3.7 years, with 50% of exits taking place by the third year of the investment
(and 75% by the fifth year). The average IRR is 1.8% but increases to 17.6% if only
positive returns are taken into account. Approximately one-third of all exits resulted in
a partial or total loss. These statistics need to be interpreted cautiously. First, there are
the identification and selection challenges that were discussed earlier. Second, there
may be a tendency for angels not to disclose underperforming investments. But third,
and serving as a counter-balance to the previous point, angels, may be unwilling to
report exceptionally high-performance investments on account of their preference for
anonymity and to avoid the risk of fiscal investigation.
In summary, the Italian informal venture capital market has grown steadily in the
past decade in terms of the number of reported investments. The financial crisis there-
fore does not appear to have adversely affected the willingness of angels to invest. This
contrasts with the Italian venture capital market which declined over the same period
(AIFI 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). This highlights the crucial role that BAs play in the
supply of early stage equity capital. The riskiness of such investments is managed
through a cautious investment strategy in terms of both the amount invested and the
proportion of personal wealth that this represents and the number of investments that
they make each year. The average performance outcome is positive and has increased
in the time period under consideration, which has been one of the economic recession
and austerity, which underlines the ability of business angels to select good investment
opportunities, giving rise to potentially more successful new ventures. A further
possible influence on the improved investment performance is networking and training
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the Italian informal venture capital market (2007–2012
average).
Variable Value
Number of investments (2007–2012 total) 553
Average investment €202,110
IRR 1.78%
Age 48
Gender Male (94%)
Education Degree or higher (92%)
Wealth €1,540,600
Wealth invested 16%
Contribution to financed firms Strategy (56%)
Source of deal flow BAN (51%)
Venture Capital 279
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r V
inc
en
zo
 C
ap
izz
i] 
at 
02
:19
 25
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
activities that have been periodically organised by IBAN for its associates, which aims
to improve the ability of BAs to read, criticise and grade business plans.
3.3. Methodology and research hypotheses
The sample for the econometric model is constituted of 96 exits, which reflects the lim-
ited number of exits (less than 20% of angels reported exits) and the exclusion of
unconfirmed deals from the sample. The main goal of the empirical analysis is to test
the existence of a statistically significant relationship between a dependent variable,
built as a proxy for the performance of a given deal realised by angel investors, and a
set of explanatory variables which make reference to both the investor and the deal.
Regarding the dependent variable, business angels often evaluate their returns as a mul-
tiple of their initial investment (total return). However, consistent with literature about
business angels, to better compare different investments we use as a proxy of profitabil-
ity a ratio showing on a percentage basis the amount returned to investors to the
amount invested (distributed-to-paid-in-capital), computed as annualised effective com-
pounded rate of return which we label the IRR. Table 3 shows the IRR divided by year
of exit, industry, experience of the investor (measured as number of investments per-
formed in lifetime) and holding period. The average IRR is calculated as a non-com-
pounded arithmetic mean, since the money value of some deals was not available due
to incomplete questionnaires from respondent BAs.
With regard to the year of exit, in the years of the financial crisis (from 2008 to
2010) the average IRR is negative, as expected. However, there is a considerable
Table 3. IRR descriptive statistics.
Average IRR (%) Number Standard deviation (%)
Year of exit
2007 17.67 8 42.31
2008 −5.50 23 43.62
2009 −1.74 24 38.11
2010 −9.16 15 38.92
2011 13.44 11 7.71
2012 12.49 15 20.71
Industry
MCD 9.80 16 36.32
High-tech 8.04 39 36.36
M&E −15.23 9 36.24
Financial Services 5.08 7 37.12
Services −7.92 25 35.01
Experience (investments in lifetime)
≤8 5.02 39 36.15
>8 −0.43 57 36.38
Holding period (years)
≤3 −3.08 58 36.36
>3 9.19 38 36.51
Rejection Rate
≤50% −10.41 11 35.51
50–85% 3.96 47 35.18
>85% 0.31 38 34.82
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variation between industries in this period, with media & entertainment (M&E) and ser-
vices showing negative IRRs, while manufacturing, commerce and distribution (MCD),
tech & ICT and financial services have positive returns. Once investor experience is
taken into account, the results are unexpected: investors with less experience obtained a
higher IRR, while the most experienced investors have negative returns. Finally, invest-
ments with a low holding period result in negative IRRs. This is likely to reflect the
shorter lifespan of failed businesses, with other studies showing that most total losses
usually occur within the first two years of investment (Mason and Harrison 2002b).
Given the high standard deviation and presence of outliers in the IRR data, in the
econometric models this variable is winsorised at a 10% level (i.e. equalling outliers to
data in the 5th and 95th percentiles).3 Furthermore, standard errors have been clustered
for multiple investments in the same company.
Regarding the independent variables, the determinants of profitability of the invest-
ments by business angels have been selected by a 2-step process: selection of a wide
set of variables from the literature dealing with investments by both formal and infor-
mal venture capitalists, as analysed and classified in Section 2 (step 1), and a screening
process aimed at choosing a short list of determinants making reference to the output
of the survey dealing with personal features of business angels (step 2). In this way, it
has been possible to select an original set of explanatory variables when compared with
previous studies, constituted initially by the following: industrial sector, experience,
holding period, rejection rate of business angels and year of exit. Furthermore, the inde-
pendent variable ‘rejection rate’ characterising the deal flow and screening process of
business angels which is tested needs to be emphasised on account of its innovative-
ness as a determinant of the profitability of business angels’ investment.4
The remainder of this section describes all the independent variables and a
description of the research hypotheses to be tested.
3.3.1. Industry
This is a series of dummy variables. More precisely, the different sectors of economic
activity are aggregated into five categories: Manufacturing, Commercial & Distribution
(MCD); Media & Entertainment (M&E); Financial Services; High-Tech;5 Services. This
classification is based upon two considerations. First, the number of sectors is very
high. Depending on the year, it can vary from 12 to 14. When compared with the num-
ber of observations could lead to wide differentials in terms of the number of observa-
tions across sectors and, thus, lead to limited statistical significance of the empirical
analysis. Second, the list of sectors available to respondents varies each year, making
the original classification inconsistent and hence not usable for comparison.6 Embed-
ding all the different sectors into clusters restores homogeneity across years and across
observations. That being said, the high-tech sector plays a key role in the economy on
account of both its rate of growth and contribution to job creation. Therefore, the
following research hypothesis to be tested expresses the expected impact of this first
explanatory variable.
H1: Investments in the high-tech industry earn a significantly higher return than invest-
ments in other industries.
The data show that the high-tech industry has the second best average return, after
MCD. It is worth noting, however, that high volatility could jeopardise the effort to
find statistically significant differences amongst industries. In order to test the
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hypothesis, high-tech investments have been set as the benchmark for returns on invest-
ments in other industries, thus setting aside the high-tech dummy variable from the
econometric model.
The econometric model used to test H1 is as follows:
IRRj ¼ aþ b1MCDj þ b2M&Ej þ b3Financial Servicesj þ b4Servicesj þ ej
where α = constant, j = divestment j, IRR = return on investment (profitability proxy),
MCD = dummy variable for MCD industry, M&E = dummy variable for media &
entertainment industry, Financial_Services = dummy variable for financial services
industry, Services = dummy variable for services industry, ε = residual error.
3.3.2. Experience
This is a scale variable. Following Wiltbank et al. (2009), it is computed by taking into
account the number of investments made by the angel during her life. The functional
form of the IRR related to experience is assumed to be non-linear and similar to an
inverted U-shaped, where the most experienced angels obtain, on average, lower IRR
than mid-experience ones. While it is clear why a low level of experience might lead
to lower performance, three main reasons might underpin the fact that lower returns are
also associated with a high level of experience compared with medium-level experi-
ence. First, an increase in the level of experience might reduce the angel’s risk aver-
sion. It is reasonable to argue that those investors who, over time, obtain high numbers
of positive performances from their numerous past investments will show signs of over-
confidence in their subsequent, as documented by other empirical studies (Shane 2009).
This phenomenon also explains why the surveys performed by the major angels net-
works (EBAN, BBAA and IBAN, among others) show that over time experienced
angels tend both to increase the percentage of their personal wealth committed to start-
up investments and either abandon angel groups or are less likely to join angel syndi-
cates and therefore foregoing the associated risk reduction benefits (Kerr, Lerner, and
Schoar 2011). Second, as BAs increase the size of their investment portfolios over time
this decreases their capability both to play an active role in their investee companies
and to monitor the owner–manager of these companies, thus becoming like formal
investors, but lacking their control rights (Wiltbank et al. 2009; Goldfarb et al. 2012).
Finally, consistently with some contributions dealing with the investment process of
BAs, serial angels do not show high and increasing ability to learn from their prior
investment experiences and do not show higher performances than virgin angels
(Farrell 2006). However, the limitations of the data-set makes it impossible to
distinguish among the variety of experiences that an angel has had – such as industry
experience, start-up experience, operating experience (Mitteness, Baucus, and Sudek
2012) – or to identify the amount and quality of relevant and private information BAs
have ex ante their investment decisions.
The following research hypothesis to be tested expresses the expected impact of this
first explanatory variable.
H2. There is a U-shaped relationship between Experience and IRR. Return will initially
increase, and beyond a certain point decrease.
This reasoning is consistent with the study by Wiltbank et al. (2009), who employs a
metric similar to age – the number of years which angels have been investing in
unquoted companies – to refine the measurement of experience. Strong grounds for this
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practice is also provided by research on the relationship between CEOs and top
management and firm performance (Henderson, Miller, and Hambrick 2006; Gottesman
and Morey 2010).7 The similarity between this field and the informal venture capital
industry is based on two considerations. On the one hand, business angels are hands-on
investors and entrepreneurs find their experience at least important as the capital they
provide. On the other hand, the IRR of private investors is related to the actual or
potential performance of the investee firm. For these reasons, in this paper experience
is measured as the number of previous investments that the angel has made. Descriptive
statistics shown in Table 3 give qualitative confirmation of the research hypothesis.
The econometric model used to test H2 is as follows:
IRRj ¼ aþ b1Experiencej þ b2Experience squaredj þ ej
where α = constant, j = divestment j, IRR = return on investment (profitability proxy),
Experience = number of investments in lifetime, Experience_squared = squared number
of investments in lifetime, ε = residual error.
3.3.3. Holding period
This is a scale variable, but is expressed in the model as a dummy. There are several
reasons to believe that the relationship between this variable and the IRR is somewhat
ambiguous. One common belief about long holding periods is that the angel is having
difficulties in divesting on account of the lack of success of the investee company. On
the other hand, there are reasons to believe that the relationship will be positive. In fact,
contrary to venture capital funds, which have a short time horizon for their investments
in growth companies, angels are long-term investors, holding their investment for
3–5 years on average (Wetzel 1983; Sohl 1999, 2007; Johnson and Sohl 2012). This is
also because they invest in the early stage of start-up businesses, even at the seed stage,
hence time is needed to allow the investee company develop. Moreover, angels invest a
very low proportion of their own wealth in entrepreneurial ventures, and therefore have
the freedom to decide not to divest in situations where the market does not fairly value
their company. For these reasons, it is reasonable to believe that divestments which
occur within the third year (the minimum in the range provided above) will be related
to abandonment of the project on account of the failure of the business. Therefore, data
on holding periods have been divided into two categories: equal or lower than
three years and higher than three years. This leads directly to the following research
hypothesis.
H3: A holding period lower than three years is associated with lower IRR.
The data presented in Table 3 give us qualitative confirmation of this hypothesis. As
can be seen, holding periods below three years are generally associated with negative
returns, while angels who liquidate their investments after three years are generally
rewarded with a higher return, averaging 9.19%.
The econometric model used to test H3 is as follows:
IRRj ¼ aþ b1High holding periodj þ ej
where α = constant, j = divestment j, IRR = return on investment (profitability proxy),
High_holding_period = dummy variable equal to 1 for durations higher than three -
years, ε = residual error.
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3.3.4. Rejection rate
This is a scale variable. It is computed as 1 minus the ratio number of investments over
the total number of projects evaluated by the investor (1 − acceptance rate):
RR ¼ 1 Number of investments performed=number of investments consideredð Þ
The best way to calculate this ratio would be to use the total number of investments
ever made over the total number of investments ever evaluated by the angel. This latter
number is very difficult for an individual to recall, and indeed are unlikely to count.
The questionnaire, instead, provides us with the number of investment opportunities the
investor came across each year. In order to maintain homogeneity, the numerator is
computed as the number of actual investments made by the investor in the same year.
Regarding the relationship between this independent and the dependent variables,
the IRR should increase at a diminishing rate together with the increase in the RR.
Therefore, the relationship between the two variables is also expected to be non-linear
and, more precisely, we chose a logarithmic one. The reason for the logarithmic form
of the RR variable lies in the observed phenomenon that for professional investors it is
quite easy to immediately identify the worst investment projects by simply having a
look at the submitted business plan (Clark 2008). However, as the volume of deal flow
increases it would be time consuming to identify the best projects without entering into
deep analyses and due diligence. But if only a limited number of investments are
available each year, a high RR implies that potentially good investment opportunities
will be excluded.
Three main assumptions must hold for such a non-linear metric to add value to the
model. First, the projects which come to the various business angels are, on average, of
the same quality; otherwise an investor who receives a few high-potential business
plans might register an RR equal to 0, but still makes a very high return compared with
the others. The assumptions appear still more realistic when we remember the role and
the screening process performed by the angel syndicates (Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar
2011), to whom the vast majority of surveyed angels belong. Second, as observed in
the literature review, maximising financial returns is a major motivation for angel inves-
tors, though not the sole one. Pursuing such an objective implies for the need to care-
fully screen all proposals coming from their sources of deal flow, and the adoption of
highly selective investment behaviours. A final assumption deals with the assumed
rationality of the investment behaviours of business angels, implying that when infor-
mal venture capitalists subject investment proposals to scrutiny, they hold the money to
invest in it during that given year. An angel who does not intend to invest would have
RR = 1, even though she came across very good proposals, but then her evaluation
would be a waste of time and resources, since she would not invest in the first place.
A possible limitation to the explanatory power of this metric is that, given the
economic period in which observations were collected, the rejection rate could be artifi-
cially high not because of differences in the application of the ‘deal killers’, but
because of a lack of funds or poor market perspectives.
Therefore, the following research hypothesis to be tested expresses the expected
impact of this fourth and novel explanatory variable.
H4: As the rejection rate increases, so does the IRR, at a diminishing rate.
The econometric model used to test H4 is as follows:
IRRj ¼ aþ b1ln Rejection Ratej þ ej
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where α = constant, j = divestment j, IRR = return on investment (profitability proxy),
ln_Rejection_Rate = natural logarithm of the rejection rate, ε = residual error.
3.3.5. Year of divestiture
This is a series of dummy variables. Divestments which occurred before the financial
turmoil – in 2007 and 2008 – are expected to have obtained higher returns, ceteris
paribus.
Since company valuations are often based on multiples of the valuations of compa-
rable publicly traded companies (Weidig, Kemmerer, and Born 2005), the years of eco-
nomic recession (2008, 2009, 2010) – characterised by decreasing annual GDP,
significant volatility of capital markets, the credit crunch and high unemployment levels
– are expected to cause lower market prices, and therefore lower returns for private
investors, whose investee firm would be undervalued. Therefore, five dummies were
created, with the base being 2007.
The following research hypothesis states the expectation about the impact of yearly
macroeconomic growth on the IRR of business angels’ investments.
H5: IRR will be lower for divestments which took place in the immediate aftermath of the
current financial turmoil and economic recession.
A first, qualitative look at the sample’s data (Table 3) seems to confirm the hypothesis.
The IRR is around 17% in 2007, 13% in 2011 and 12% in 2012, while the years in
between register negative returns ranging from −8 to −9% and −2%.
The econometric model used to test H5 is as follows:
IRRj ¼ aþ b1Y 2008þ b1Y 2009þ b1Y 2010þ b1Y 2011þ b1Y 2012þ ej
where α = constant, j = divestment j, IRR = return on investment (profitability proxy),
Y_2008 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the exit took place in 2008, Y_2009 = dummy
variable equal to 1 if the exit took place in 2009. Y_2010 = dummy variable equal to 1
if the exit took place in 2010. Y_2011 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the exit took
place in 2011. Y_2012 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the exit took place in 2012.
ε = residual error.
In order to test the interaction among all the independent variables and the IRR, a
final overall econometric model has set the dependent variable as the IRR, while the
independent variables are the full set of variables previously identified, together with
specific control variables on both different exit strategies, as already anticipated, and
the education of BAs, so as to avoid potential spurious effects due to their correlation
with the independent variables themselves (see Appendix 1).
4. The performance of investments by business angels: empirical analysis
The final econometric model, which has been implemented using a backward proce-
dure, is able to explain 34.9% (R2) of the variability of the dependent variable.8 Table 4
shows the results of the regressions for the five research questions, while Table 5 shows
the results of the overall model regression analysis.
H1 is not supported. This means that, given the specification of the model, for the
sample analysed, investments in the technology sector do not lead to significantly
higher returns compared with investments in other industries. The results also show that
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investments in the M&E industry are the worst performing when compared to the
returns from the technology sector.
H2 is fully supported. Experience does have a positive impact on IRR (positive
beta, significant at a 5% level). The variable Experience_squared is also significant
(5% level) and has a negative beta. This means that experience positively affects IRR
up to a certain level, after which additional levels of experience lead to decreasing
returns on investment. Therefore, experience is related to IRR with an inverted
U-shaped relationship, confirming the expectations in terms of experience,
overconfidence and performance of BAs.
H3 is partially supported. The variable Hold_high is positive and significant at the
10% confidence level. Therefore, investors who maintain their financial resources in the
investee company for more than three years show a return that is 5% higher than that
of investors who, ceteris paribus, hold their investment for less than three years.
Table 4. Regression analyses testing the research hypotheses.
Independent variables
Dependent variable: IRR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Industry – MCD −0.0306
(0.0456)
Industry – M&E −0.147***
(0.0499)
Industry – Financial Services −0.0358
(0.0651)
Industry – Services −0.0664
(0.0411)
Experience 0.0369**
(0.0158)
Experience_squared −0.00259**
(0.00118)
High holding period 0.0506*
(0.0295)
lnRejectionRate 0.0660
(0.0674)
Y_2008 −0.0375
(0.0742)
Y_2009 −0.0471
(0.0711)
Y_2010 −0.0426
(0.0750)
Y_2011 0.0681
(0.0685)
Y_2012 0.0513
(0.0766)
Constant 0.0832*** −0.0418 0.0244 0.0591*** 0.0561
(0.0225) (0.0412) (0.0241) (0.0212) (0.0646)
Observations 96 96 96 96 96
R2 0.080 0.040 0.026 0.013 0.083
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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In other words, the independent variable has a positive, although not strong, linear
relationship with IRR.
H4 is supported. Investors who are more selective with the projects they evaluate
earn on average 10.4% higher returns than less selective investors. Furthermore, it
seems to confirm the assumption of the non-linear form of the independent variable
rejection rate.
H5 is not supported. Even though the descriptive statistics showed that the average
return during the period of financial crisis – from 2008 to 2010 – is negative and lower
with respect to years less affected by the downturn, this difference is not statistically
significant. Only exits in 2011 show a statistically significant higher return than exits in
2007, at a 5% level.
Amongst the many potential limitations of the analysis that are related to the identi-
fication and measurement issues affecting the sample of surveyed angels is the substan-
tial unobservable heterogeneity across both angel investors and financed ventures. For
this reason, as already specified in the previous section, we tested the robustness of
results by excluding the potential effects of outliers, winsorising IRR, the dependent
variable. The major findings of the empirical analysis which was run in this study can
be partially compared with some relevant contributions at the international level dealing
with the formal venture capital industry. Starting with the most interesting finding of
this study, which is the quadratic relationship that links experience with the perfor-
mance of business angels’ investments, it can be noted that Parhankangas and
Hellström’s (2007) study of the Finnish venture capital industry also found – similar to
Italian informal investors – that the most experienced venture capitalists tend to overes-
timate the probability of success of the ventures they finance, thus confirming the
inverted U-shaped form of such an explanatory variable. Other contributions dealing
with VC industries in developed markets (Rosenstein et al. 1993; Sapienza and
Korsgaard 1996) have found that inexperienced venture capitalists earn lower returns
than more experienced ones. However, Fleming (2004) finds that in emerging markets,
experienced venture capital firms do not earn higher returns than inexperienced ones.
Table 5. Overall model regression analysis – significant variables only.
Independent variables IRR
Industry – M&E −0.154***
(0.0374)
Exit – Sale Back 0.148***
(0.0375)
Exit – Trade Sale 0.200***
(0.0324)
Exit – Other Investor 0.230***
(0.0452)
lnRejectionRate 0.104*
(0.0594)
Y_2011 0.0745**
(0.0335)
Constant −0.0826***
(0.0292)
Observations 96
R2 0.349
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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The conclusion is that the results of this study are consistent with the outcomes of
many studies of the formal venture capital industry in demonstrating that both inexperi-
enced angels and angels with overwhelming experience tend to earn lower returns.
Obviously one major limitation of the data-set is that it is not possible to delve deeper
into the kind of experiences of the surveyed angels, which prevents any differentiation
between different kinds of experience (operating experience, industry experience,
start-up experience) and, therefore, different degrees of ‘post-investment involvement’,
as in the cases of Mason and Harrison (1996b), Macht (2011b) and Mitteness, Baucus,
and Sudek (2012).
Looking at the relationship between holding period and IRR in the formal venture
capital industry, Stevenson, Muzyka, and Timmons (1987) and Manigart et al. (2002)
reach opposite results to those of this study. They demonstrate that venture capital firms
expect to generate higher returns when they plan to divest within the first few years of
making the investment. Closed-end venture capital companies need to return the financial
returns that have been generated by successful exits to the investors in the fund. This
implies that the fund cannot reinvest the money to increase returns, and will therefore
require higher yields if a shorter holding period is anticipated. The key difference which
explains the opposite result obtained in this research is that business angels invest their
own money, and their involvement in the firm is high and effective when compared with
that of venture capital fund managers. For these reasons, angels will gain a higher return
with a longer holding period (minimum three years), during which period the
entrepreneur can take advantage of the expertise and network that the angel can provide.
Finally, the relationship between rejection rate and IRR is also an important contri-
bution from the empirical analysis, underlining the relevance of the selection process
undertaken by BAs. Future research, based on a more powerful and unbiased data-set,
should test the hypothesis presented in this study by controlling for the different stages
of the investment decision process of BAs, either as sole investors or as members of a
syndicate of angels. Furthermore, industry experience, which is different from the vari-
able ‘experience’ used in this paper, could be a driver of the investment decision-mak-
ing process of BAs, thus influencing the rejection rate.
5. Conclusions and policy suggestions
The descriptive and econometric analysis performed in this paper sheds some light on
business angel investing, a still opaque and minimally regulated segment of the capital
markets, which is nevertheless crucial in order to fill the small business funding gap
and boost the creation of new start-up companies. First, the study provided a compre-
hensive review of the literature on informal venture capital, sorting the different studies
into eight different groups, each with specific research questions. Second, it analysed
the results of six yearly surveys – from 2007 to 2012 – carried out by the IBAN
(2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). This represents the most comprehensive database
which provides data on Italian business angels over a 5-year time period. The descrip-
tive analysis, performed with methodologies that have been adopted in many other con-
tributions, provides an accurate and updated snapshot of the attitudes, behaviours and
characteristics of Italian business angels. Finally, the empirical analysis produces some
significant results and the econometric model, which both introduced an original set of
independent variables (industry, experience, holding period, rejection rate, year of
divestiture) and chose different and more appropriate functional forms for the indepen-
dent variables (either linear or non-linear), is innovative.
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Although the econometric model used in this study requires to be better specified –
and there may also be scope for the identification of further explanatory variables – the
outcomes of the empirical analysis provide insights for business angels regarding
the key capabilities and behaviours to boost financial performance. BAs should adopt
the following strategies in order to increase the performance of their investments: (a)
develop selective investment strategies by accessing large volumes of investment
opportunities and rejecting a high proportion of the business plans that they review; (b)
increase their expertise by making more investments rather than a small number of
large considerable ones; (c) avoid being overconfident, for instance, by sharing
information with other angels and by co-investing and (d) invest with a long-term
perspective.
In view of the roles played by experience and a selective investment approach this
study also identifies some potential public policy interventions aimed at stimulating the
size and expected profitability of the domestic informal venture capital market. The
quadratic relationship between experience and IRR implies that angels should gather
experience as quickly as possible in order to avoid being on the left part of the inverted
U-shaped curve. Two instruments allow angels to accumulate experience without expe-
riencing with lower IRRs. The first is to co-invest with other angels through syndicates.
In this way, angels can learn from more experienced peers and thereby lower their risk
exposure. The advice of co-investors and network members can also limit the risk of
overconfidence which threatens the investment performance of expert angels’. The sec-
ond is participation in specific training courses offered by the BANs to angel investors,
with financial support coming from focused public policy measures, to give angels instru-
ments to enable them to better evaluate business plans and improve the quality of their
screening processes. The positive relationship between rejection rate and IRR demon-
strates that angels with more stringent deal killer criteria will generate higher returns.
Syndication and BANs play a key role in the refinement of angels’ investment criteria
and their ability to evaluate business plans with view to increasing their potential IRR.
Increasing the affiliation of angels in officially tracked and legitimated BANs would
also increase the possibility of accessing a wider set of investment opportunities which
have been pre-screened by BANs themselves, thus leveraging on the possibility of
implementing highly selective approaches to investment. However, BANs in Italy are
still not fully organised or officially legitimated and do not have the financial resources
to offer the types of educational services which angels would benefit from. If public
incentives were focused on both stimulating network membership and competence-
building inside BANs (Mason 2009), BANs would have the financial resources needed
to offer educational services and more angels would participate. In addition, angels
would benefit from sharing experiences with other BAN members. Higher levels of
experience and better evaluation skills, together with higher rejection rates, would lead
to higher investment performance and, therefore, to a more efficient informal venture
capital market. This, in turn, could further increase the financial resources available to
start-up businesses, stimulating the growth of the economic and social system.
Notes
1. The following contributions provide empirical evidence on the major determinants of the per-
formance of venture capital investments: Gompers and Lerner (2004), Cochrane (2005),
Gompers (2010), Jeng and Wells (2000), Kaplan and Strömberg (2004), Kaplan et al. (2009),
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009), Metrick and Yasuda (2010).
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2. Additional details on IBAN are available at: http://www.iban.it.
3. Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2011) chose a different strategy by using a regression discontinuity
approach in order to build a more homogeneous sample of angel investors which removes
the endogeneity issue coming from omitted variable biases.
4. We excluded from the original research programme and from a preliminary draft of this
paper the variable “exit strategy” because of the high number of incomplete answers in the
questionnaires, thus dramatically reducing the data-set, and because other contributions
(previously mentioned in Section 2) proved the significance of such a variable. However, we
considered exit strategy as a control variable in the final overall regression model later on
specified at the end of this section.
5. Includes Electronics, ICT and Biomedical.
6. For instance, the sector ‘other services’, which includes construction, security and medical
services (IBAN 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012), is present in the 2010 annual survey, but not in the
2008 one.
7. Research in this field widely uses age as a proxy for experience of manager, with conflicting
results: Henderson, Miller, and Hambrick (2006) find that firm performance, especially for
high-tech firms, declines across the tenure of the CEO, whilst Gottesman and Morey (2010)
conclude that a manager’s age is positively related to firms’ results.
8. The backward procedure starts from the complete model, which includes all the possible
explanatory variables. At each step the statistical software automatically removes the variable
with the lowest t-statistic (if it is not significant). It is possible do define a criterion of mini-
mum significance required to keep each explanatory variable in the final model. In this case,
the minimum level of significance was set at 10%.
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Appendix 1. Description of variables for the overall regression analysis
The overall regression model has the following specification:
IRRj = α + β1MCDj + β2M&Ej + β3Financial_Services j + β4Services +
β5Experiencej + β6Experience_squaredj + β7High_holding_periodj + β8ln_Rejection_Ratej +
β9Y_2008 + β10Y_2009 + β11Y_2010 + β12Y_2011 + β13Y_2012 + β14Exit_Strategy_Sale_
Back + β15Exit_Strategy_Other_Investor + β16Exit_Strategy_Trade_Sale + β17Education + εj
Variable Description
IRR The IRR % of BA’s investment, winsorised at 10% level
Industry – MCD A dummy variable equal to 1 if the industry is MCD
Industry – High-tech A dummy variable equal to 1 if the industry is High-tech
Industry – M&E A dummy variable equal to 1 if the industry is M&E
Industry – Financial
Services
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the industry is Financial services
Industry – Services A dummy variable equal to 1 if the industry is Services
Experience The number of angel investments performed during the lifetime of the
BA
Experience squared The squared number of angel investments performed during the lifetime
of the BA
High holding period A dummy variable equal to 1 if fhe duration of the investment is
higher than three years
Rejection Rate The natural log of the rate of dropped projects among the total number
of analysed projects
Year – 2008 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the divestiture took place in 2008
Year – 2009 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the divestiture took place in 2009
Year – 2010 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the divestiture took place in 2010
Year – 2011 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the divestiture took place in 2011
Year – 2012 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the divestiture took place in 2012
Exit strategy – Sale
Back
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the exit strategy is sale back to the
entrepreneur
Exit strategy – Other
Investor
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the exit strategy is sale to other
investor.
Exit strategy – Trade
Sale
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the exit strategy is trade sale
Education A variable equal to 1 for high school diploma, 2 for degree, 3 for MBA
and 4 for PhD
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